



Safety Rapporteur Report

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


Summary Observations

- 7 papers: 1 European, 1 Joint, 5 US
- Need for **EARLY** Safety Analysis
- **Historical Analysis** Required for Hypothesis Confirmation
- **Analysis Prioritization** Methodology is Required to Proceed from System CONOPS to **Qualitative** Fault Tree/Hazard Analysis to Quantitative Analysis
- **Quantitative Analysis** is Required to Provide System Specifications for New Technology and Procedures
- Quantitative Analysis will Develop **Validated Models** that provide both Normalization and **Quantitative Safety Metrics** for System Monitoring
- We have a Shortage of **Trained Safety Analysts** to deal with large number of Issues to be Addressed
- Example Analysis Presented for New En-Route System Concept, UAV's in the NAS, Wake Vortex Encounter and Runway Incursion Severity

Safety Needs

- Recent accidents involving ATM
- Increasing traffic (capacity)
- Advanced systems (2012; 2017; 2025)
- *Keep ATM safe*
- *Anticipate & Resolve Problems*
- *Learn before accidents occur*




Guiding Principles

- ATM must become a **learning** organization
- ATM must have **suitable methods** with which to anticipate and protect itself against risks
- Safety must be built in at the **early stages** of ATM system **design**, right through to implementation
- ATM must improve safety in **key risk areas**
- ATM must be sure that the systems it is developing will **deliver the required safety levels**
- ATM must retain its 'High Reliability' status and its '**safe culture**'
- The above **collaboration** should be achieved effectively and cost-efficiently

Safety Methods


- Toolbox of 30+ methods (FAA + Eurocontrol + ANSPs):
 - Hazard and human error identification
 - Representation in fault and event trees
 - Quantification of events & human errors; evidence from incidents/simulations
 - Analysis of dependence and common mode failures
 - Evaluation of uncertainty, sensitivity, and risk impact
 - Determination of safety requirements
 - Documentation for re-usability
- Need more Analysts Trained to use these tools



Select HF Issue (e.g. "Recovery from Failure")			
What if?	Likely Impact	Safeguards	Action
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Brainstorm What ifs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Analyse Likely Impact & Safeguards for each What if		
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Analyse all other columns for each What if	
Select next HF Issue (e.g. "Staffing and Organisation")			

Safety in Design

- EEC therefore carries out concept exploration and preliminary design
- EEC research suggests that **50% of accidents have their roots in the design phase**
- EEC has a safety policy, and safety plans for sector tools, traffic flow, and airport research areas
- Safety activities are ongoing for each project in these areas
- Integrative project is ongoing to determine safety levels for the integrated vision for 2012




Historical Analysis for Hypothesis/Model Validation

Analysis of Daily OE Count: Tower OE


$$\ln(\lambda_i) = \alpha + \beta_0 \ln(OP_i) + \beta_1 \ln(WI_i) + \sum_j \beta_j \ln(Factor_{ij}) + \sum_k \gamma_k D_k$$

Parameter	Description	Estimate	Standard Error
α	Intercept	-17.00	0.57
β_0	Logarithm of operations	1.97	0.09
β_1	Logarithm of weather index	-0.68	0.08
β_2	Log of Airfield/Airspace Delay	0.33	0.03
β_3	Log of Arrival Delay	0.04	0.03
β_4	Log of Downstream Congestion	-0.15	0.04
γ_{2001}	Yearly dummy variable for 2001	0.22	0.03
γ_{2002}	Yearly dummy variable for 2002	-0.08	0.03
Scale		0.264	


Process for New WV CONOPS Analysis Prioritization




Safety Assessment for New En-Route System Concept (AAC)




Safety Assessment



UAV Safety Analysis Simulation Components



 = areas of planned growth

WV encounter Probability Can Be Computed Using Aircraft and WV Stochastic Models

- **Two Phase WV Decay and Propagation Model (2P2) combined with Aircraft Arrival Flight Track Deviation Model (3 DOF)**
- **Effects of Cross Wind and Cross Wind Variance can be evaluated**
- **Encounter Probability and Severity can be Computed for any mixture of Aircraft Types**

Severity of Runway Incursions

- **Safety Analysis is moving from just Event Counting to **Modeling** Events and Assessing **Severity** of Events**



Congratulations “S/V Esprit” The Best Boat Won



From the “S/V Ana G”